Two decades later, the Rwandan genocide has been broadly analysed and to a certain extent, so has the French response to the genocide. Nevertheless, even though the literature covers extensively how the French executive responded to the genocide, it remains confusing when it comes to explaining why it responded in such a controversial way since two -somewhat contradictory -accounts have been put forward. In order to address this lack of clarity, the article analyses these main accounts and concludes that they both present key weaknesses that prevent us from fully understanding France's controversial response. Building on Prunier's testimony, this article suggests a third explanation by arguing that the 'Fashoda syndrome' had a strong influence on President Mitterrand and should be taken into account more consistently, not only when studying the French response in Rwanda, but also Mitterrand's foreign policy in Africa more generally.
Introduction
In 1994, the world -already shaken up by images from Cambodia, Somalia and Former Yugoslavia -discovered the scale and intensity of the atrocities of the Rwandan genocide.
Twenty years on, the literature available offers key insights to understand the factors and actors that made this tragedy possible. They include, among others, the colonial heritage (Kroslak 2007, 21-22) , the lack of political will of the international community to act rapidly (Jamison 2011, 371) , a difficult international context with the failures of previous United Nations (UN) interventions (Wheeler 2000, 216) , a lack of leadership from the UN Secretary General (Jones 2007, 160) , and poor communication between the UN Secretariat and the 1 and the génocidaire regime and the controversial French response (in particular, Opération Turquoise), the role played by France also became a factor put forward to explain the genocide. Consequently, key publications have analysed the ties between the French executive 1 and the génocidaires, along with France's response to the atrocities (see for instance Des Forges (1999), Melvern (2000) , Kroslak (2007) and McNulty (1996 McNulty ( , 2000 ).
Nevertheless, even though the existing literature has extensively described and evaluated the French response, it has failed to provide a clear explanation as to why the executive responded to the genocide in such a controversial way by mainly promoting two different -if not contradictory -accounts of France's response. The first, which was mainly put forward by the French executive over the years and is still predominant in France despite international research, consists in arguing that the French executive misunderstood the actors and the nature of the conflict, and therefore overstepped in its cooperation with the génocidaire regime (see in particular Quilès 1998). On the other hand, the majority of the academic literature, especially the Anglo-Saxon one, argues that the controversial French response was part of France's neo-colonial policy in Africa (see for instance Renou 2002; Gregory 2000) . The goal of this article is to analyse and test each account in order to better understand the factors and actors that led the French executive to respond in such a controversial way to the largest mass atrocities committed since World War II.
After studying France's response to the genocide, the article evaluates the traditional accounts that have predominantly been put forward by the existing literature. First, it analyses and critiques the idea that the French executive misunderstood the actors and the nature of the conflict as it does not explain why France kept supporting the Hutu-led regime even after the genocide had begun. Second, it explicates that although the claim that France was undertaking neo-colonial practices in Africa presents some convincing arguments, it only offers a limited explanation of the French cooperation with the isolated génocidaire regime due to its lack of inclusion of the domestic and international contexts. This account thus leaves a central question unanswered: what about Rwanda justified having strong ties with the génocidaire regime of a small, relatively poor African state, with no colonial ties to France?
The article then promotes a third account, which argues that the executive responded in a controversial way in order to stop the influence of the 'Anglo-Saxons' in the region. This account was originally suggested by Prunier (1997) -the advisor to the government at the time -and has remained underused by the existing literature, probably because contradictory testimonies can be found on whether or not the syndrome played any role in the French response. Building on Prunier's testimony, this article argues that the influence of the Fashoda syndrome should be taken into account more consistently when studying France's role in the genocide, and also Mitterrand's foreign policy in the continent more generally. It does so after examining the strengths of this argument and addressing its weaknesses, by clarifying the scope of the influence of the syndrome and taking into account additional evidence and testimonies from members of the executive close to Mitterrand. Finally, critiques of Opération Amaryllis emerged from the fact that the intervention was supposed to be impartial, but also assisted the Rwandan Government Army (Forces Armées Rwandaises -FAR). For example, Kroslak explains that 'the French used UNAMIR vehicles to move Rwandans of known extremist background to the airport, where they were flown out of the country ' (2007, 224) . This lack of impartiality can also be seen in the fact that the Rwandans who benefited from the evacuation were mainly Hutus and part of the Habyarimana regime or family, while the Tutsis were left behind (McGreal 2007; SaintExupery 1998) .
France's controversial response to the Rwandan genocide
The controversy over the French response to the genocide intensified with Opération
Turquoise (see Fournier (1995) for a detailed account of the intervention). On 20 June 1994, France volunteered to organise a multinational mission until UNAMIR II was operational (Mérimée 1994) . Despite the large amount of doubts and critiques coming from France, Rwanda and the international community, and considering the lack of any other volunteers to send troops and the guarantee by France that it would be a multinational humanitarian intervention (see The UN Security Council 1994a, 5-6) , the Security Council authorised on 22 June 1994, an intervention for two months with the chapter VII mandate requested by
France. The next day, Opération Turquoise began and so did the critiques in regards to its intent and outcomes.
First, in terms of France's intent, the timing of the operation was surprising.
Mitterrand had been receiving a lot of pressure from the public opinion to intervene especially once the media began reporting that France had contributed to the training of the Rwandan Army -and therefore, of some of the génocidaires. As Gounin explains, the 'French public opinion wavered between horror and shame: the horror of a genocide of an unknown violence … and the shame of having allowed, or worse, participated, in such a slaughter ' (2009, 46) . There was therefore a need to 'downplay the negative publicity of France's support for the Habyarimana regime' (Jones 1995, 231) and in fact, Prunier argues that it became a necessity for the government to act 'in the hope of washing off any genocidal bloodspots in the baptismal waters of "humanitarian' action" ' (1997, 296) .
However, despite this public pressure and the fact that, as Opération Turquoise showed, France was capable of mobilising troops rapidly, Mitterrand only decided to intervene when the genocide was practically over. By the time the operation took place, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 2 had indeed started fighting back and had already made real progress to the point that the génocidaires were withdrawing (Adelman 2000, 432) .
In addition to the timing of the intervention, the extent of the force deployed by African soldiers' (Ladsous 1994 ).
The outcomes of the operation were also criticised as they were far from being only humanitarian. For instance, the humanitarian protected zone created in South-West Rwanda was used to provide refuge to some of the génocidaires, and to facilitate their escape to Zaïre. under French protection ' (2002, 156) . Additionally, the French denied access to the zone to the RPF -even after they took control of the government -and also refused to turn over some Hutus to the RPF and the UN (Wheeler 2000, 234 (Kroslak 2007, 3, 33, 36 ).
Glaser and Smith argue that France was not the only power to have been convinced by the Rwandan regime's willingness to reform: Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany had all agreed to increase their cooperation with Rwanda after it appeared prepared to overcome a violent history in order to promote development (Glaser and Smith 2005, 142-143; Smith 2005, 76) . Similarly, Deguine and Smith argue that France was not the only power to be 'blind' to the génocidaire character of the Hutu-led regime in light of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Habyarimana (2011, 131) .
In addition to arguing that Mitterrand misjudged the Rwandan regime, this account claims that the French president also misinterpreted the nature of the RPF by seeing it as a foreign group threatening the interests of Rwanda, rather than a legitimate domestic group fighting for the Tutsis' right to come back. For instance, in October 1990, when the RPF attacked Northern Rwanda from Uganda, Mitterrand argued that the attack had been perpetrated by a foreign group rather than by a minority fighting for its rights (Prunier 1997, 106) . As the consequence of this two-fold misunderstanding of the main actors of the conflict, this account argues that in contrast to the majority of the international community, rather than a domestic conflict.
Even though these claims can be seen as an attempt by the French executive and its supporters to cover up France's ties to a génocidaire regime, this account still has significant traction in France. This is facilitated by several factors. First, a large majority of the population remains considerably unaware of the extent of the French involvement in the Rwandan genocide as it is not studied at school or university and when it is, the role played the negotiation table (Jones 2007, 143) . This reinforcement of French assistance was key to the defeat of the RPF and was once again justified by claiming that this assistance aimed to support a democratic leader protect its country from an international threat.
In addition to explaining the increased military cooperation with Rwanda in the beginning of the 1990s, the claim that Mitterrand misunderstood the conflict allows to make Deguine and Smith 2011, 130-131) . As the Quilès report explains, By aiming to stabilise half of the Rwandan territory, on which the exercise of an authority would have been re-established, Opération Turquoise did not attempt to restart the offensive of the FAR against the RPF, but aimed to preserve a situation in which the conditions of the negotiation of a cease-fire followed by a political negotiation would remain. (1998, (324) (325) In other words, this account argues that one of the main goals of Opération Turquoise was to make sure that the Hutu regime would be represented in the new government even though the RPF was defeating them on the ground. As Glaser and Smith explain, this decision was based on key 'analytical mistakes ' (2005, 144) among which were a misunderstanding of the 'murderous potential of the division between Hutus and Tutsis' and the idea that 'the powersharing planed in the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in August 1993 was a realist democratic solution ' (2005, 145) .
Nevertheless, while this account offers elements of answer to understand the FrancoRwandan relations, it presents strong weaknesses, which at the very least, question its validity. First, even the Quilès report inquires why the French executive did not rethink its perception of the Hutu-led regime and its cooperation, 'considering the weak progress registered in terms of democratisation ' (Quilès 1998, 360) . Despite Habyarimana's promise in 1990, there was indeed a considerable lack of reforms undertaken between 1990 and 1994.
Additionally, it seems surprising that Mitterrand truly believed that the RPF was a foreign invader from Uganda rather than an ethnic group of Rwanda: if it really was the case, why did Habyarimana ask France for help in October 1990 rather than going to the United Nations, which clearly condemns the violation of sovereignty in its Charter? This decision is even more surprising considering that when Habyrimana discovered the attack, he was already in New York -home of the UN headquarters -to attend a UN Children's Emergency
Fund's conference (Prunier 1997, 100) .
Finally, and most importantly, this interpretation of France's response does not help us explain why France continued to support the Hutu regime even after the genocide had been confirmed. The United Nations was reluctant to recognise that a genocide was taking place in Rwanda considering that it would require the international community to respond.
Nevertheless, by June 1994, the fact that a genocide was being perpetrated was largely Nevertheless, the next day Opération Turquoise began and some of the génocidaires received assistance.
The old habits of France in Africa
A second account, more commonly suggested in the academic literature, argues that the assistance to populations in danger is not a crime yet. But it is a moral and political failure that has already cost too many lives and too much harm to too many abandoned populations' (Mitterrand 1981 It is important to emphasise that this strong commitment to humanitarian intervention was essential for the French executive as it allowed the promotion of France's rank. It helped France prove that it was 'capable to assume the political, military, financial, and human costs' of the interventions (Tardy 1999, 80) in what it perceived to be a changing world order.
With the end of the Cold War, France indeed felt pressured to justify its permanent seat at the UN Security Council (Guillot 1994, 34) as in contrast to the Cold War, it was no longer enough for France to impose itself as a 'third way' between the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, the executive wanted France to be a key European leader and counted on this status to promote its influence and power in the world. However, it feared that Germany's reunification and subsequent empowerment was a potential obstacle to France's European status (Macleod 1997, 247) . Consequently, a lot relied on France's status of key actor of humanitarian assistance and this account does not explain why the French executive was willing to endanger its project 'of disseminating a universal Republican message' (Cumming 2013, 27 ) and the interests associated to protect the génocidaire regime of a relatively poor small African state, which was not even an old colony.
Additionally, this claim fails to take into account the changing context in This Anglo-French rivalry remained strong during the early post-Cold war era. In particular, tensions were high between the UK and France in the early 1990s:
While the UK and France both increased support to the poorest African countries (cancelling some debt, untying some aid and targeting some assistance), they did not cooperate on poverty reduction. Britain remained primarily concerned with promoting neo-liberal reform while France continued to provide hard loans and to allocate a fifth of its aid to promoting French cultural concerns. The two countries also began competing more openly for energy resources, consultancy work and other commercial contracts in each other's African sphere of influence Chafer 2011, 2443 ).
The role played by the syndrome in the French response to the Rwandan genocide was originally suggested by Gérard Prunier -a key adviser of the executive at the time -in his testimony The Rwandan crisis: History of a genocide (1997) . Even though the goal of his book was not specifically to explain the causes of the French response, the influence of the Fashoda syndrome emerged from his work (see in particular Prunier 1997, 102-107) .
According to Prunier, it 'is the main reason -and practically the only one -why Paris intervened so quickly and so deeply in the growing Rwandese crisis ' (1997, 105) .
After analysing the strengths of the claim and addressing its weaknesses by clarifying the scope of the influence of the syndrome, and taking into account additional evidence and testimonies from members of the executive close to Mitterrand, this article builds on Prunier's research and argues that the key to understanding the controversial French response to the genocide lies in taking into account the influence played by this ideational factor on President Mitterrand. This syndrome is the key to filling the gaps left by the two previous claims.
The first strength of this account lies in the fact that it allows us to make sense of the French interest in Rwanda despite its lack of considerable natural resources. The FrancoRwandan relationship goes back to the 1960s, when General De Gaulle supported the independence process of Rwanda from Belgium and its membership to the United Nations (Quilès 1998, 31) . On 20 October 1962, the two states signed a friendship and cooperation pact before signing on 4 December 1962, three economic, cultural and technical agreements (Quilès 1998, 18-19) . By 1969, a plan to help Rwanda's development was defined, and a Help and Cooperation Mission was created in Kigali, therefore making the French presence in the country 'stable and permanent ' (Quilès 1998, 19) .
As admitted in the Quilès report, France's interest for the country can be explained by its specific position in the Francophone zone (1998, (30) (31) (32) . Even though Rwanda did not have many resources, or at least not enough to justify a strong support from France, it was at the frontier of the Francophone zone and it was a neighbouring state of Zaïre -a country very rich in natural resources -which France was highly interested in, but that was also being coveted by the Americans. Consequently, it can be argued that, Secondly, this account explains why the French President was willing to support an undemocratic leader, while accepting to see the RPF as a foreign threat rather than an ethnic group of Rwanda. This decision was made as early as 1990 when the RPF undertook its first attack. Prunier argues that considering that the RPF came from Uganda, Paris saw the 1990 attack as 'a typical test-case -an obvious "Anglo-Saxon" plot to destabilise one of "ours", and one we needed to stop right away if we did not want to see a dangerous spread of the disease ' (1997, 106) . Mitterrand having declared in 1990 that France would not intervene in the domestic affairs of African states (in Quilès 1998, 34-35) , describing the RPF as an external threat allowed the executive to fight the Tutsi-led group and to make it a common Franco-Rwandan enemy. Fighting the RPF thus also became 'a way of fighting it out with the "Anglo-Saxon" enemy by proxy, without the need for a major war' (Prunier 1997, 111) , and
Prunier suggests that 'this is how Paris found itself backing an ailing dictatorship in a tiny distant country producing only bananas and a declining coffee crop without even asking for political reform as a price for its support ' (1997, 107) .
Last but not least, the Fashoda syndrome helps us understand the nature and scope of the French response to the genocide, and more specifically, the timing of Opération Turquoise, the extent of the force deployed, and the fact that France only intervened in South Chaban-Delmas 1959 in Chirac 1996 . Therefore, even though this notion does not exist from a legal point of view as it does not appear in the Constitution, 'the idea that defence and foreign policy belong to the domaine réservé still does' (Kessler 1999, 24 ) and Mitterrand's presidency was no exception: he handled almost exclusively the Franco-African relations, and in particular the Franco-Rwandan one (Amalric 2008; Saint-Exupery 1998 Zaïre cannot be fully understood without taking into account the influence of the AngloFrench rivalry (Chafer and Cumming 2010, 550; Wheeler 2000, 233) . Even though the French executive had suspended its assistance to Zaïre in 1991 due to the lack of reforms of the Mobutu regime, it became willing to support the controversial regime in 1994 in order to maintain its influence in the region and prevent the Anglo-Saxons from becoming a significant player in this rich African state where pro-French Hutus were taking refuge.
Notes
1 The term French executive should be understood as the French President (Mitterrand) , his key advisors and the ministerial office-holders. 2 The RPF is a group constituted mainly from English-speaking Tutsis as many Tutsis had to take refuge in neighbouring, English-speaking countries such as Uganda after their defeat during the HutuRevolution in the early 1960s.
3 Hutu militia who participated in the genocide.
4 Leader of the RFP and current President of Rwanda. (2013)). 7 The Arusha Agreement was signed in June 1992 and was 'an extremely ambitious plan that called for Tutsi-Hutu power sharing, an integrated Hutu-Tutsi army, democratic elections and a transitional government' (Fleitz 2002, 150) . 8 Mérimée indeed declared, 'for two months now, the population of Rwanda has been the victim of unprecedented massacres, of such magnitude that one no longer hesitates to describe them as genocide' (in The UN Security Council 1994a, 5).
9
The 'devoir d'ingérence' is often translated as duty to intervene, duty of intervention or duty to
interfere. Nevertheless, since neither of these expressions captures completely the concept, the French term is used in this article. 10 Kouchner is the creator of Médecins Sans Frontières and Bettati is a distinguished international legal scholar and was the administrator of the Faculty of South-Paris at the time.
11 Even though Resolution 688 only ambiguously linked a humanitarian crisis with the notion of threat to international peace and security, it constituted a key milestone in the development of the norm of humanitarian intervention by giving the opportunity to the UN Security Council to debate the idea of a duty to humanitarian assistance and the broadening of the meaning of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security (see Wheeler (2000, 144) and Bellamy (2004, 218) ).
12 France participated to UNIKOM, MINURSO, ONUSAL, UNAMIC, UNPROFOR, UNTAC, UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNOMIG and UNMIH (The United Nations 1991 . 13 Line of fortification built in the 1920s-1930s at the French frontier in order to protect France from a German invasion.
14 For instance, General Quesnot explained that Kagame, the leader of the RPF was 'the man of the Americans' (in Nouzille 2010, 382).
15
The word 'perceived' is used here since the validity of the Anglo-Saxon threat has been questioned.
Nevertheless, what matters here is how it influenced the design of French foreign policy.
16 US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1989 to 1993.
17 President of Uganda.
